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Abstract
Since 2004 the Howard Coalition government has implemented a new policy framework and
administrative arrangements as part of its program of reform in Indigenous affairs. In this paper I
will describe both the parameters of this reform program and review the processes established to
support the implementation of national Indigenous health strategy. In particular, I will consider both
the shift from a policy framework based on 'self-determination' to one based on 'mutual obligation',
and the implementation of Shared Responsibility Agreements (SRAs) that are based on the latter
principle. I will use the example of the Mulan SRA to illustrate the difficulties in articulating the 'new
arrangements' with current approaches to Indigenous health planning and strategy implementation.
I conclude that 'new arrangements' pose a number of problems for Indigenous health planning and
strategy that need to be addressed.
Background
In 2004 the Howard Coalition government embarked on
a radical reform program in Aboriginal affairs, beginning
with the announcement on 15 April 2004 of its intention
to abolish the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Com-
mission (ATSIC). [1] The Commission had been estab-
lished under legislation passed in 1989, which merged the
program responsibilities of the Department of Aboriginal
Affairs and the Aboriginal Development Corporation.
ATSIC's original structure included regional councils that
had a role in regional resource allocation. A board of com-
missioners, which were elected from the pool of regional
councillors, had oversight of ATSIC's national programs
and were also responsible for the provision of policy
advice to the Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Affairs. [2,3]
The Australian government's decision to abolish ATSIC
was announced in the context of the run-up to the 2005
federal election. Only a few weeks earlier, the opposition
leader of the Australian Labor Party, Mark Latham,
launched a similar policy – in which ATSIC was to be
abolished but replaced with a new regionalised body. [4]
Prime Minister Howard's announcement, in this context,
did give the appearance of policy on the run. However,
this government had been in longstanding conflict with
ATSIC on a number of fronts. For instance, ATSIC resisted
the Howard government's move away from a rights-based
agenda in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander affairs to
one based on 'practical reconciliation'. The Commission
had also faced persistent allegations of corruption and its
critics charged it with the failure to improve outcomes for
Indigenous Australians. [2,5,6]
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In 2002 the Australian government commissioned a
review of ATSIC. The review panel recommended the
retention of the Commission, but with significant struc-
tural reform. [7] The government, however, did not wait
for the review to be completed before tackling structural
reform – from July 2003 the commission was split into
two arms, an elected and an administrative arm (Aborigi-
nal and Torres Strait Islander Services, ATSIS), in order to
create a 'separation of powers'. [2] Despite these measures
the Australian government, by April 2004, had come to
the:
very firm conclusion that ATSIC should be abolished and that
it should not be replaced, and that programmes should be main-
streamed and that we should renew our commitment to the
challenges of improving outcomes for indigenous people in so
many of those key areas. [1]
In the months that followed, ATSIC's programs were real-
located to Australian Government departments and port-
folios (see Table 1); the National Indigenous Advisory
Council was established and the development of 'Shared
Responsibility Agreements' (SRAs) was initiated. [8-10]
In the last two years over 100 SRAs have been developed
(for a comprehensive register of these agreements see
[11]). The critique of SRAs has focused on linking a discre-
tionary benefit to basic civic rights; concerns about the
capacity to evaluate them; the potential of SRAs to pro-
duce health outcomes and their underpinning ethics [12-
14]. Notwithstanding the concerns raised about the SRAs,
the current Aboriginal affairs minister, Mal Brough,
remains positive about their contribution, even whilst
announcing a review of their implementation [15].
The idea of 'mutual obligation' underpins this new
approach to Indigenous affairs. This policy construct has
been used to frame the development of the SRAs – which
I illustrate below using the 'Mulan agreement' as a case
study. This new policy framework in Indigenous affairs
departs from a regime based on the notion of 'self-deter-
mination' (first introduced to national policy in 1972).
[3,16] It is arguable as to whether this shift in policy has
been based on an informed review of trends in outcomes
or even an analysis of the application of the principles of
self-determination to policy and service delivery. Here,
however, it is my intention to describe the contours of
these reforms – not to evaluate the basis for them.
When ATSIC was established, Aboriginal health was one
of its program responsibilities. However, the responsibil-
ity for the administration of this program was transferred
to the health portfolio in 1995, following the evaluation
of the National Aboriginal Health Strategy (endorsed
1989) and lobbying by the Aboriginal community con-
trolled health sector. [17,18] Since then, considerable
focus has been given to the development of mechanisms
to coordinate the implementation of Aboriginal health
strategy and planning within the health sector. This has
resulted in the development of multi-sectoral intergovern-
mental Framework Agreements, a national approach to
performance management and the development of
regional planning forums. Strategy development has
focused on both the development of the health care infra-
structure (with a priority for primary health care) and bio-
medically defined priorities. [19-21]
Following the transfer of the Aboriginal health program,
ATSIC continued to play a significant role in inter-sectoral
strategy in Indigenous health. ATSIC's environmental
health and housing programs addressed significant deter-
minants of Indigenous health. Consequently, the respec-
tive roles, responsibilities and working relationship
between the health portfolio and ATSIC were defined in a
Memorandum of Understanding that was agreed to in
1995. [17]
In the sections below I describe the parameters of this
reform program and the mechanisms currently associated
with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander health strategy
and planning. The implications of the broader reform
agenda in Indigenous affairs for strategy and planning in
health is considered in the concluding discussion in this
article.
Mutual obligation
Mutual obligation has been a contested concept in Aus-
tralian public policy over the last decade, particularly in
debates on welfare reform. Although the idea has a much
longer history, emerging originally from eighteenth and
nineteenth century debates about the social contract that
binds citizens and state, it has been mobilised in this con-
text by what has been constructed as the of 'problem of
welfare dependence'. [22,23] Some commentators claim
that welfare dependence is not explicitly defined in the
Government policy, lending it to ambiguous or contradic-
tory interpretations. [23] Nevertheless, it can be inferred
that welfare dependence is seen to emerge when individ-
uals on income support rely on governments, not so
much because they lack the capacity for self-reliance, but
the will. [23] Accordingly, Prime Minister Howard out-
lined in an address to the 'Australia Unlimited Roundta-
ble' in 1999:
Just as it is an ongoing responsibility of government to support
those in genuine need, so also is it the case that – to the extent
that is within their capacity to do so – those in receipt of such
assistance should give something back to society in return. [24]Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2006, 3:10 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/3/1/10
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Table 1: The transfer of ATSIC programs to Australian government departments and portfolios. Source: [8]
Australian Government Portfolio/Department
ATSIC program transferred
Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs
Indigenous rights
International Issues
Public Information
Repatriation
Planning and Partnership Development
Community Participation Agreements
Native Title and Land Rights
Indigenous Women's Development
Indigenous Women
Office of Torres Strait Islander Affairs
Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs Portfolio
Indigenous Land Fund
Indigenous Land Corporation
Torres Strait Regional Authority
Registrar of Aboriginal Corporations
Regional Councils
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Services
ATSIC Housing Fund
ATSIC's functions under the Native Title Act
Business loans and program grants made by ATSIC before 1 July 2003
Administration of the Regional Land Fund
Department of Employment and Workplace Relations
Community Development and Employment
Business Development program
Employment and Workplace Relations Portfolio
Indigenous Business Australia
Department of Family and Community Services
Community Housing and Infrastructure
Family Violence
- Family Violence Prevention (shared with Attorney-General's Department)
- Family Violence Partnership program
Family and Community Services Portfolio
Aboriginal Hostels Limited
Department of Communications, Information Technology and the Arts
Arts, Culture and Language
Broadcasting
Sport and Recreation
Department of Health and Ageing
Effective Family Tracing and Reunion Services
Department of the Environment and Heritage
Maintenance and Protection of Indigenous HeritageAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2006, 3:10 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/3/1/10
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According to the Office of Indigenous Policy Coordina-
tion (OIPC), governments and Indigenous people "have
rights and obligations and all must share responsibility".
[25] The problem, as they see it, being that:
Despite best intentions, over the last 30 years, programs and
services have been delivered in ways that increase dependence
on government and welfare, rather than building on the crea-
tivity and self-reliance of Indigenous people. [25]
The assumptions that underlie this position and the appli-
cation of 'mutual obligation' in Aboriginal affairs have
been contested, as they have been in the broader welfare
sector. Some Indigenous leaders, such as Noel Pearson,
have advocated positions that converge with this idea. He
argues, for instance, that the "provision, without reciproc-
ity, of income support to able bodied people of working
age can be seen as 'negative' welfare, including passivity
and dependence." [26] Nevertheless, he cautions in an
article with Patrick Dodson against the potential 'dangers'
of an uncritical application of 'mutual obligation' – partic-
ularly the extent to which the idea can be potentially used
to unnecessarily intervene in private lives and in particular
social and economic behaviours. [27]
In the public debate on Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander self-determination there has been a tendency to
focus on ATSIC as the sole institutional manifestation of
this policy [18]. It is significant in this regard that the new
policy structure, the National Indigenous Council, was
established by Ministerial appointment and not elected
representation. [9] However, at its broadest, the policy of
self-determination has been realised through a number of
different processes. This includes the development of par-
ticipatory policy processes, Indigenous management of
services (such as primary health, legal, housing and
related community services) and, more generally, the pro-
motion of Indigenous leadership and decision-making.
[16,28]
Notwithstanding the broader approach to the application
of principles of self-determination, Australian Govern-
ment strategy continues to rely to a significant extent on
the delivery of Indigenous-specific health and community
services through Aboriginal cooperatives that have locally
elected boards of management – the ACCHs. [19] In
2003, prior to the abolition of ATSIC, all Australian gov-
ernments signed onto the National Strategic Framework
for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health. This in
effect locks in the Howard government, at least in the
medium term, to a strategy in which key result area one:
aims to continue support for adequately resourced, well-planned
ACCHSs. It advocates partnerships between community con-
trolled health services and mainstream services to ensure that
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities have access
to the full range of services expected within the comprehensive
primary health care context. It supports the fundamental prin-
ciples of community decision-making, influence and control
over the way health services for Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander peoples are managed and delivered. [21]
Reforms in indigenous program administration
On 30 June 2004 the Minister for Indigenous Affairs
announced, "more than $1 billion of former ATSIC/ATSIS
programs have been transferred to mainstream Australian
Government agencies and some 1300 staff commence
work in their new Departments as of tomorrow". [29] The
new administrative arrangements for these programs is
summarised in Table 1. However, there is more to this
reform program than the disestablishment of the Austral-
ian government's Indigenous bureaucracy. A number of
the reforms also draw upon current debates in Australian
public policy and internationally about the development
of effective whole-of-government responses or "joined up
government" recognising that "Both the effective develop-
ment of policy, and the efficient delivery of the services
that are the concrete manifestation of policy, are equally
hinder by departmentalism". [10,30] To that end the
reforms in Indigenous program administration include
the creation of central co-ordination mechanisms such as:
￿ A ministerial taskforce that operates as a cabinet com-
mittee, providing collaborative leadership and setting
strategic directions.
Attorney-General's Department
Legal and Preventative
Family Violence Prevention (shared with Department of Family and Community Services)
Education, Science and Training Portfolio
Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies
Finance and Administration Portfolio
Office of Evaluation and Audit
Table 1: The transfer of ATSIC programs to Australian government departments and portfolios. Source: [8] (Continued)Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2006, 3:10 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/3/1/10
Page 5 of 10
(page number not for citation purposes)
￿ A Secretaries group supporting ministerial decision-
making, coordinating across government agencies, and
overseeing annual reporting.
￿ An Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination (OIPC),
with functions that include responsibility for, coordinat-
ing whole-of-government policy, program and service
delivery across the Australian Government and between
other levels of government and the private sector. [10]
Under these new arrangements, it is intended that all Aus-
tralian government departments will contribute to a sin-
gle coordinated budget submission for Indigenous-
specific programs. [10] This process is untested, and it is
at the leading edge of these reforms. Over the last decade
significant growth in Aboriginal health program funding
as been achieved within the context of the health portfo-
lios budget process. [31] It remains to be seen as to
whether this can be sustained with initiatives in Aborigi-
nal health competing with those in other sectors such as
housing, education etc.
Regionally, the "joined up government' agenda in Aborig-
inal affairs is supported through the creation of Indige-
nous Coordination Centers (ICCs). It is intended that the
ICCs will provide Indigenous Australians with a single
point of contact with Australian government depart-
ments. Accordingly, each ICC is described as a 'whole of
Australian government office', with staff from multiple
agencies, headed by a manager responsible for developing
the relationship with Aboriginal communities and coordi-
nating the efforts of other government agencies. The ICCs
are responsible for the development of SRAs. [10,32]
The formal connection between the ICCs and the Com-
monwealth Department of Health and Ageing has evolved
slowly. Currently, there are about 21 health staff who have
been assigned a relationship with 33 ICCs. Health staff
have been co-located within an ICC in only a few
instances, and a number cover more than one ICC (Office
for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health, personal
communication.).
Indigenous health strategy and planning since 
1995
Since 1995 the key elements of the national planning
framework that has been established for Indigenous
health includes:
￿ The National Strategic Framework for Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Health which was signed off by the
Australian Health Ministers Conference in 2003. This
strategy outlines the agreed priorities and key result areas
for national development in Indigenous health [20,21].
￿ The agreement to an Aboriginal Health Performance
Measurement framework that is aligned with the National
Strategic Framework. [33]
￿ Framework Agreements in Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Health, which are intergovernmental agreements
that provide the basis for collaborative service planning
and development.
￿ Joint Planning Forums, which have been established at
a jurisdictional level under the Framework Agreements
and are responsible for the development of State and
regional Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander health
plans.
The regional planning process has been critical to aligning
health planning with nominated priorities and identified
gaps in services. They have played a significant role in bro-
kering agreements between different levels of government
and the ACCHS sector. The development of the infrastruc-
ture and resources for Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander primary health care is a high priority in both
Commonwealth health policy and in nationally agreed
strategy. [20,21] In this context, the ACCHS and other pri-
mary health services play a significant role, both as a focus
for capacity building, but also a vehicle for the delivery of
disease- and risk-based strategies.
The Mulan Agreement
The 'Mulan Agreement' was one of the first SRAs to be
developed. Mulan is a small Aboriginal community, pop-
ulation 150, 400 kilometres southwest of Halls Creek on
the edge of the Great Sandy Desert in the remote north-
west of Australia. The proposed agreement, dubbed the
'Hygiene Pact', attracted controversy in the Australian
media. [34-38] Some, such as Patrick Dodson, said it rep-
resented a "return to native welfare days". [38] Other press
reports pointed out that the local community (through
the Catholic school) had already initiated a hand and
face-washing program 18 months earlier in order to
improve the control of trachoma eye disease. It has been
suggested that this had been used to gain leverage in this
SRA to get the Australian Government to pay for the
installation of a petrol bowser. [39] I will return to this sig-
nificant fact below.
This particular SRA has two goals:
￿ To strengthen the Mulan community economy through the
installation of fuel bowsers that will provide income to the local
store and improve tourism opportunities; and
￿ Improve health within the community, particular among chil-
dren, through the implementation of strategies to reduce theAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2006, 3:10 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/3/1/10
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incidence of trachoma, secondary skin infection and worm
infestations. [40]
Here I will focus on the health component, and specifi-
cally that which is related to trachoma control as this
aspect of the deal attracted most of the debate.
In this SRA, the Mulan community was entitled to a dis-
cretionary benefit of $A172,260 to pay for the installation
of petrol bowsers (the University of Melbourne's Agree-
ments, Treaties and Negotiated Settlements Database
records a slightly higher figure of $221,000). [35,41] The
Western Australian State government for its part was to
ensure that children were tested regularly for trachoma,
skin infection and worms and to monitor health serv-
ices.[40] In return for their discretionary benefit the text of
the draft agreement stipulated that the Mulan community
would:
￿ through the Council, and in conjunction with the Community
Consulting Agents and the Clinic, start and keep up a program
to make sure kids shower every day, wash face twice a day;
￿  Through the CDEP program [Community Development
Employment Program] ensure that rubbish bins are at every
house and that they are emptied twice each week;
￿ Through the housing manager ensure that household pest
control happens four times each year;
￿ Through the ESO [Essential Services Officer] ensure that the
rubbish tip is properly managed;
￿ Work with the Community Consulting Agents to develop and
put in place strategies to ensure that petrol sold through the
store is no used for petrol-sniffing; and
￿ Work with the Community Consulting Agents to monitor and
report on the extent to which the community, family and indi-
vidual commitments set out in this agreement are met.
Further the agreement specifies that families and individ-
uals in the Mulan Community will:
￿ Make sure kids get to school, crèche and the clinic when they
should;
￿ Make sure kids shower daily and wash faces twice daily
￿ Keep homes and yards clean and rubbish free and ensure that
household rubbish gets into bin straightway – not on ground or
in houses
￿ Ensure all households rents are paid so that Council can
afford pest control, repairs (eg plumbing) and cost of rubbish
removal. [40]
Trachoma control programs
The face-washing component of the Mulan SRA was spe-
cific to the control of eye disease caused by trachoma. Tra-
choma is an infectious disease of the conjunctiva, or
lining of the eye, which has both an acute phase (manifest
in early childhood) and chronic outcomes – the most sig-
nificant of which is adult blindness. In Australia, the dis-
ease is now almost exclusively an Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander disease – having been absent for over a cen-
tury in the broader population. This decline in the
broader community occurred prior to the introduction of
trachoma control programs and is largely attributed to the
improvements in housing and environmental infrastruc-
ture. [42]
Current national guidelines for trachoma control are
based on a strategy endorsed by the World Health Organ-
ization and they emphasise a of range activities summa-
rised by the acronym SAFE or: S(urgery); A(ntibiotic
control); F(acial cleanliness); E(nvironmental preven-
tion). In sum, the SAFE acronym articulates a multi-fac-
eted strategy with distinct components. [42-44]
Environmental health strategies for trachoma control
include activities that aim to improve the quality of hous-
ing, and environmental health hardware such as water
supply, sewerage systems, garbage disposal etc. This com-
ponent of a trachoma strategy is argued to be fundamental
to long-term control on the basis of compelling circum-
stantial evidence. [43] Direct evidence for environmental
measures in trachoma control, however, is limited to a
small study that documented the impact of a fly control
program. [43,44] Face-washing programs have been
developed because of an observed correlation between
facial cleanliness and active trachoma. However, the evi-
dence that links such programs and improved community
trachoma prevalence is weak. [43] National guidelines
also advocate a range of antibiotic regimes for the treat-
ment of infected and un-infected individuals depending
local epidemiology of the disease. [42] Finally, surgical
treatment is recommended for chronic trachoma (trichia-
sis) as this has shown to be effective in the prevention of
blindness. [42,44] All strategies depend on the local deliv-
ery of a range of health and public health services by an
appropriately skilled workforce.
In summary, effective trachoma control requires an inte-
grated primary health and public health approach to its
management and control with a:Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2006, 3:10 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/3/1/10
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combination of screening activity and antibiotic and surgical
treatment, and environmental improvements to promote per-
sonal and community hygiene. [44]
The Mulan SRA and trachoma control
The Mulan SRA deals with only one component of the
comprehensive strategy required to control trachoma. It
focuses on the behaviour of individuals and the local
community council. The evidence to support its particular
focus on face-washing activities is limited and at best indi-
rect. The agreement does not address the delivery of the
health, public health services, housing and environmental
programs, which are integral to comprehensive trachoma
control programs. It is silent on critical issues including
which government agencies are responsible for the plan-
ning, development and delivery of these services.
In one sense this is to be expected as SRAs are in general
designed to focus on the provision of a discretionary ben-
efit. Unlike standard service agreements, SRAs do not
specify the relationship between funding inputs, service
activity or outputs and outcomes. Nevertheless, the suc-
cess of this Mulan SRA (in terms of trachoma control)
depends on the appropriate funding and coordination of
a range of broader activities and services. The link between
the local ICC and the regional planning process estab-
lished in health are significant in this regard. It was made
clear as a result of questions raised at the Senate Estimates
hearings that officers from the Commonwealth depart-
ment of health who managed the Indigenous eye health
program did not provide advice on the development of
this agreement, although there was input from the
regional public health Unit of the Western Australia
Health Department. [45]
Trachoma control is complex and if SRAs are to tackle
health problems such as this, the local ICC needs to be
able to access public health expertise to ensure that they
are based on current evidence and best practice. Taking
into account the limited scope of this SRA, it seems
broadly consistent with current guidelines, although it
could be argued that the focus on the hygiene practices of
Aboriginal children would be better broadened to family
activities. However, this issue raises broader questions as
to how ICC managers establish health priorities with local
communities. Is a focus on trachoma control the appro-
priate priority given the range of health issues confronting
remote communities? To that end, it is critical that mech-
anisms are established to ensure that ICC managers have
access to the necessary public health expertise to guide
decision-making.
The negotiation of an SRA such as this may well provide a
focus for consolidating activity that addresses local health
priorities. In a context in which local leadership has
focused a community on its responsibilities, this may pro-
vide an opportunity to support local success. In this
instance there is good evidence that there was significant
community leadership in negotiating this deal. However,
it should also be noted that there is no evidence to sug-
gest, at this stage, that the provision of discretionary ben-
efits will influence individual behaviours in a sustained
way. In this respect the SRA is distinct from the applica-
tion of mutual obligation to individual welfare transfer
payments where the threatened removal of benefits can
act as a powerful incentive. It seems doubtful that if a SRA
was negotiated with a non-Aboriginal community that the
provision of some new infrastructure, such as roundabout
or swimming pool, would be a sufficient incentive to
cause sustained individual behavioural change. It is not
unreasonable to ask whether the installation of a petrol
bowser will similarly form an incentive for sustained
behaviour change.
Monitoring and evaluation
Given the untested assumptions that underpin this new
approach, it is important that the efficacies of these
arrangements are tested through rigorous monitoring and
evaluation processes.
The Mulan agreement was first announced in December
2004. Yet by April 2005 there were reports in the press
that the prevalence of Trachoma in Mulan had decreased
from a high of 70 per cent in 2004 to zero. [46,47] How-
ever, trachoma prevalence data is collected in this region
at the same time every year (around September). This is
done in order to minimise the impact of seasonal varia-
tion on prevalence data. Prevalence data fluctuates each
year, depending on a range of factors including seasonal
changes (it is more common in dusty dry conditions) and
population mobility (in a small community the absence
of one family may have a significant impact on rates) (see
Table 1). The high prevalence of trachoma in 2003 (70 per
cent) was probably the result of an unusually dry year, and
this probably also accounted for the increase in preva-
lence (to 58 per cent) which occurred in 2005 following
the announcement of the Mulan agreement. Nor could
the SRA had any impact on the low prevalence (16 per
Table 2: Trachoma Prevalence: Mulan. Source: [49]
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Prevalence % 17.9 40.9 30.7 24.3 32 27.4 75 16 56Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2006, 3:10 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/3/1/10
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cent) that was measured in 2004, given that the agreement
was not negotiated until after the annual screening had
taken place. Trachoma prevalence had never reached zero
in Mulan as was claimed in The Australian, and it is the
long-term trend data that is more significant here, not the
dips and falls between years.
Press commentary on this agreement has fluctuated from
premature claims of success to equally premature claims
of failure. Politicians on all sides have exploited the vari-
ous reports of prevalence data. When given the opportu-
nity, the then Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, Senator
Amanda Vanstone, did not correct the premature claims
that were circulating in the press in April 2005. [47]
Whether she was misinformed or mischievous is probably
moot. Certainly, when it became apparent that the preva-
lence data for 2005 had in fact risen, Opposition Senators
also took the opportunity to score political points during
the Senates Estimates process.[48] The political stakes in
this new agenda are clearly high. This only further under-
scores the need for rigorous independent evaluation.
Commentary
There are a number of key issues that need to be addressed
if SRAs are to be effective for Indigenous health strategy.
In the first instance, it seems unlikely to work if they were
to be used as vehicles for a radical agenda to erase Indige-
nous self-determination. In the second, critical issues
between the relationship between these agreements and
Indigenous health planning need to be addressed.
SRAs were established to signal a move away from the
principles of self-determination in Aboriginal policy. The
abolition of ATSIC was further emblematic of the desire of
the Howard government to engage with Aboriginal Aus-
tralia without the mediating influence of representative
structures or bodies. However, it is difficult to imagine
how a SRA could be effectively negotiated without the
input of a local Aboriginal leadership, organisation or rep-
resentative structure playing a role in the process of nego-
tiation. To the extent that it has been successful, the Mulan
SRA demonstrates the importance of an organised local
leadership. It does not seem possible, without developing
a new process, how local priorities would be understood
or communicated.
It could be further argued that regional and national peak
policy bodies continue to play a role in successful imple-
mentation of local agreements. The relationship between
the National Aboriginal Community Controlled Health
Organisation (the peak body representing ACCHs) and
the health portfolio has deteriorated over recent years. Yet
this continues to be a source of expert advice on clinical,
population health and service issues in Aboriginal health.
The current national guidelines for Trachoma control
were developed with the input of NACCHO, which has
the potential to mobilise the expert knowledge and expe-
rience of workers in this sector. It would be counter to the
success of government strategy to completely erase such
institutional manifestations of self-determination.
More significantly, the development of a partnership with
the Aboriginal community controlled sector has been
foundational to most national strategy in Aboriginal
health. [20,21] This sector plays a significant role in the
delivery of primary health care services to Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander people – it is likely, for pragmatic
reasons alone, that effort will still need to be placed on the
development of capacity in this component of the health
system. Notwithstanding the significant role of main-
stream primary health services, Indigenous-managed serv-
ices continue to play a key role in this arena.
If locally agreed SRAs, which focus on health outcomes,
are to be successful they need to articulate with estab-
lished processes in Indigenous health strategy. Health
gain in nearly all instances requires more than simple
individual behavioural change. If the Mulan agreement is
to have an effect in terms of health gain, behavioural
change needs to be supported by the provision of effective
primary health and environmental health services. Health
planning, service development and workforce develop-
ment need to align with these local priorities. It is
acknowledged that some steps have been taken to connect
the ICCs with the health portfolio, but the question
remains as to whether this is adequate.
Whilst a focus on the development of relationships
between ICCs and regional planning processes will be crit-
ical, it is also important that the development of SRAs also
reflects best practice and evidence about effective disease
control. It would be inefficient to establish regional proc-
esses to collate, synthesise and analyse evidence of this
kind – so the development of broader national mecha-
nisms is needed to inform the decision-making of the
managers of ICCs. Where best practice guidelines have
been developed, these need to be made available to ICC
managers. ICC managers need some support in identify-
ing other sources of public health advice. They also need
to be across established national priorities for Indigenous
health.
The new arrangements do provide opportunities to
progress the development of an inter-sectoral agenda in
health. Notwithstanding the ideological commitment of
some for a more radical agenda, local Indigenous leader-
ship, Indigenous-managed-services, regional bodies and
policy organisations will continue to play a role in the
roll-out of strategy. Further, if these new arrangements are
to be effective articulations need to be created in to linkAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2006, 3:10 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/3/1/10
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these processes more effectively with health planning and
expert advisory processes. Whilst these issues are clearly
critical to good policy development, it is also important
that these agreements do not reinforce a sense of failure in
local communities. In that sense there is probably much
more at stake for communities such as Mulan than the
political fortunes of the advocates and critiques of these
new arrangements. The articulation of SRAs with health
strategy and planning is critical ands deserves a close focus
in the planned review of SRA's.
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